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BOOK REVIEWS

I think Roman influence has probably been underestimated in those
other kingdoms, I do not think that the basic Germanic core can be
denied. I would hope that Professor King, or someone else, might
someday use the Visigothic family material in conjunction with that
of the other barbarian codes and produce a broader study of the
early medieval family.
KATHERINE FISCHER DREW,
Professor, Departmentof History,
Rice University

Clement E. Vose, Constitutional Change: Amendment Politics and
Supreme Court Litigation since 1900. Lexington, Massachusetts. D. C. Heath and Company, 1972. xxxvii, 446 pp. $15.00.
While change has been one of the most striking features of
American constitutional law in the twentieth century, scholars
have devoted relatively little time to studying the practical mechanics behind important legal contests. Social scientists and
historians have emphasized the undeniable fact of change, explaining periods of constitutional remodelling with broad generalizations: changing membership and hence politics of the court; emergence of social forces such as the New Deal or the civil rights
movement; or the altered way Americans have come to perceive
the nature of the law and the needs of an industrial society. While
all of those "causes" are surely at work, they miss the crucial specifics of historical change. Why did one particular case reach the
Supreme Court and another not? What difference did the relative
skills of the participating lawyers make? Who financed a specific
appeal, and what types of strategy did the sponsor use? In the
American system of constitutional adjudication, answers to those
questions may be as important-if not as exciting or obvious-in
explaining specific changes as are the impact of the New Deal or
the shifting political predilections of the judges. The great virtue of
Clement E. Vose's study, Constitutional Change, is that it addresses itself to those particulars.
Professor Vose examines a number of instances of constitutional change, by both amendments and direct Supreme Court
overrulings, and attempts to explain why they happened when they
did and in the particularform they did. He focuses on five possible
historical causes (the judges, the parties and their sponsoring
pressure groups, the opposing counsel, public opinion and social
movements, and intellectual elites) and assesses their particular
importance in each instance. While the author acknowledges that
his "explanatory variables" represent nothing new in themselves,
he argues that the relative importance of each differs from case to

THE AMERICAN JOURNAL OF LEGAL HISTORY

Vol. XVII

case and can be accurately evaluated only by studying their varying impact in individual episodes. Additionally, by stressing the
occasional determining importance of the participating counsel
and the calculating role of various sponsoring pressure groups, he
adds elements often slighted and contributes significantly to our
understanding of the actual process of legal change.
His essay on the eugenics movement in the first quarter of the
century, spotlighting the activities of the privately funded Eugenics
Record Office, clarifies the historical position of Buck v. Bell (1927)
and illustrates the ways in which pressure groups and publicists
can help inform a decision of the Supreme Court. His examination
of the briefs in Tipaldo (1936) and West Coast Hotel (1937) lay to
rest once and for all the claim made by Justice Owen J. Roberts,
the swing man in both cases, that his votes varied because of the
pleadings of counsel. Vose shows that Roberts was wrong in maintaining that counsel in Tipaldo did not call for an overruling of
Adkins, while those in West Coast Hotel did. Instead, counsel in
the former specifically cdlled for a reconsideration of Adkins, and
counsel in the latter specifically tried to distinguish. The real reasons for Roberts' switch, the author not surprisingly concludes, was
the impact of the election of 1936, Roberts' own "simplistic" judicial mentality, and the powerful leadership of Chief Justice Hughes.
In what is perhaps the most interesting chapter in the book, Professor Vose examines the twenty-three-year struggle over the successive versions of the Texas white primary which resulted in the
final declaration of unconstitutionality in Smith v. Allwright (1944).
The author carefully delineates the role of various local Texas
civil rights groups, the increasing legal sophistication of the New
York office of the N.A.A.C.P., and the contribution of prominent
counsel in polishing the final appeal briefs. The analysis lends
breadth, vitality, and insight to the story of the ultimate rejection
of the white primary.
The most perplexing aspect of the book is its sporadic social
science tone. Though the author disclaims any belief in a fully
"scientific" study of legal change, he constantly shifts back and
forth between careful historical analyses and broad generalizations about the nature of constitutional conflict. Of course, suggestive or insightful generalizations are always valuable, and no one
can fault the author for seeking them. The problem they present
here, however, is two-fold. First, the book's strength lies in its
detailed analyses, its recognition of the variety of forces that may
affect constitutional changes, and its emphasis on the need to
study specific instances fully and with great care. Intermittent
references to supposed general characteristics of constitutional
change tend to obscure the importance of those very specifics. Sec-
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ond, and more important, the generalizations themselves tend to be
bland and obvious. ("The most significant finding in this study is
that fluctuations in constitutional change are expressive of conflicts between social movements" [p. 334].) The gap between the
social science overlay and the actual results is unbridgeable. "A
clinician of constitutional change," the author declares, "notices
the readiness of losers in a political or legal encounter to blame
the system as undemocratic" (p. 244). What strikes the reader is the
utter disparity between the two halves of the sentence: the first
suggesting science, exactitude, and discovery; the second representing one of the conventions of American politics. Whether this
weakness of the book is due to a questionable social science attitude or to the requirements of the book's sponsor, The Twentieth
Century Fund, is not clear, but in any case it serves mainly to distract from the real contributions the book makes.
Conversely, it is surprising that the book fails to utilize social
science and quantitative techniques in those places where they
could be of great service. In assessing the social movements that
lent support to various constitutional demands, Professor Vose
deals with complicated problems of political and social attitudes
that could well be analyzed by quantitative methods. Not only does
the author accept some questionable correlations ("...

the Bible-

belt, temperance-minded, Progressive, rural, small states" opposing
"the agnostic and Catholic, sophisticated and cosmopolitanthough often politically conservative-states with growing city
populations" [p. 84]), but more importantly he does not provide
the kind of organized data necessary to establish those linkages.
His evidence on social movements is, instead., impressionistic, and
this adds little to an understanding of such complicated questions
as the nature of "progressivism." His repeated use of that central
term is confusing. Vose emphasizes, for example, that many progressives supported anti-Negro and anti-Catholic legislation, but
then notes how other progressives joined the N.A.A.C.P. and denounced the Ku Klux Klan. He is clearly right in acknowledging
the diversity among those labelled "progressive," but insofar as
progressivism was full of such contradictions it becomes too vague
to serve as a meaningful explanatory concept and carry the conceptual burden he assigns it. The author apparently sees progressivism as a predominantly local, rural, and Protestant movement,
but there are too many other facets of progressivism to justify that
assumption without a more precise clarification of his own definition and a convincing amount of supporting evidence. Quantitative
techniques to correlate popular and legislative votes of a variety
of issues (the initiative, the referendum, anti-Negro legislation,
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prohibition, etc.) could have aided immeasurably in evaluating the
importance and validity of the linkages Professor Vose assumes.
In the last chapter the author draws on his research to recommend a number of'reforms in the amendment and appeal processes. Though neither new nor drastic, they represent a thoughtful
attempt to open, regularize, and protect the procedures of constitutional change. Professor Vose suggests that Congress require sponsoring organizations, much as it does lobbyists, to identify themselves and their purposes in relation to appeals they are supporting.
He urges establishment of an independent research bureau for the
judiciary, restrictions to increase the "disinterestedness" of judges,
and prohibition on congressmen appearing as counsel before the
Supreme Court. Finally, he argues that Congress should enact a
statute setting out a clear procedure for constitutional amendment,
establishing time limits on ratification, and providing opportunity for orderly public debate.
Constitutional Change is a helpful and vitalizing addition to
the literature of American law in the twentieth century. It clarifies
some older issues, utilizes important new source materials, and
represents a revealing and dynamic approach to the study of constitutional history. Hopefully, it will also stimulate further studies
along similar lines.
EDWARD A. PURCELL, JR..
Associate Professor, Department of History,
University of Missouri, Columbia

Francis N. Stites, Private Interest and Public Gain: The Dartmouth
College Case, 1819. Amherst, Massachusetts. The University
of Massachusetts Press, 1972. v, 176 pp. $9.50.
Until the last decade, historical studies of constitutional law
traditionally focused on doctrinal developments, lavishing much
attention on the evolutionary process by which those doctrines
blossomed and matured. Thus we sought to explain the origins and
paths of due process, the rise and incidence of judicial review, and
the historical understanding of freedom of speech, to cite some notable examples. Historians, political scientists, and lawmen participated in such scholarly ventures, producing a solid corpus of
fundamental research that remains vital to our knowledge of American constitutional law and history. Indeed, the rich contributions
of men such as Walton Hamilton, Edward S. Corwin, and, more
recently, Leonard W. Levy, represent some of the finest and most
enduring treasures of American historical scholarship in general.

